A Kantian argument in defense of abortion

[mellowness]

Needless to say, abortion has always been a contentious issue. As I am ardently pro-choice, I want to explain why I am pro-choice in this entry. My argument in favor of abortion is derived from the moral theory of Immanuel Kant (otherwise known as Kantianism); I predicate my argument on the second formation of the categorical imperative (a major part of Kantianism alongside the first formulation), which is the idea that a moral agent is one who always treats others as ends in themselves and never as mere means. Essentially, Kant thought that we are morally obligated to respect the agency of others by never doing things to them to which they cannot consent. In fact, I think Kantianism understood in terms of the second formulation of the categorical imperative is best understood as a consent-centric system of morality.

Before I discuss my argument, I need to address a common misconception regarding Kantianism. Many people have criticized Kantian morality because they think that it fails to solve ethical dilemmas. For instance, the categorical imperative forbids lying, and in response to the Kantian prohibition of lying, some ask, "But what if I had to lie to save my friend from being murdered?" As Kantian morality categorically forbids both lying and murder, the anti-Kantian may conclude that the categorical imperative is inherently flawed. To be more abstract, these critics reject Kantianism because it allegedly ignores ethical dilemmas.

Kant responded to this objection by stating that moral situations in which an agent is commanded to follow two conflicting moral duties are situations in which the agent is deprived of full agency. And a moral agent deprived of full agency is an agent rendered not morally responsible for hir actions. In other words, whether one is obligated to do some moral action depends on whether one is capable of even doing that action. This idea is quite easy to grasp as most of us would not want to blame someone for doing something ze didn't have any real say in doing. Ultimately, Kant's "'ought' implies 'can'" principle is relevant to this argument because it entails that some actions considered under the Kantian framework are neither good nor bad; they are wholly neutral.

For the sake of argument, let's assume that the fetus has the same moral status as a sentient human being - the fetus, in other words, is a person. I don't believe that fetuses are people, but there are reasons to consider arguments in favor of abortion that do not assume that the fetus is not a person (see: Judith Jarvis Thompson's famous essay A Defense of Abortion and Don Marquis' essay Why Abortion Is Immoral).

Now, Kantianism posits no hierarchy of good. Thus, my right to bodily autonomy is just as important as my right to life. In fact, I think that the former actually subsumes the latter, but let's assume for the moment that these two rights are distinct despite being equally important. 

Consequently, a fetus' right to life is no more important than the pregnant person's right to bodily autonomy. One may then conclude that killing the fetus via abortion is wrong because it is an act of violating the fetus' right to life. However, such a conclusion is not only naive, but also wrong. A pregnant person who does not consent to hir pregnancy is deprived of agency. To regain this agency, the pregnant person must be allowed to make the choice to continue or stop the pregnancy.

That this termination of pregnancy involves the death of the fetus is irrelevant. Although the right of the fetus is being violated via abortion, this death is an unavoidable consequence of the pregnant person exercising bodily autonomy. The observant reader will notice that there are two duties conflicting with each other in the case of abortion: the duty to not treat the fetus as a mere means and the duty to respect the agency of the pregnant person. The pregnant person is deprived of any other choice and is rendered not responsible for the death of the fetus should ze decide to abort hir pregnancy. And so abortion is a morally neutral act regardless of the circumstances. A pregnant person who aborts hir fetus deserves neither praise nor blame.

In closing, let's now assume that the right to life is really just the right to bodily autonomy under a new name. In this case, the bodily autonomy of the fetus and the bodily autonomy of the pregnant person are at odds with each other. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both conflicting rights are the same, the same argument applies; the pregnant person still deserves neither praise nor blame for regaining agency via terminating the pregnancy and so killing the fetus.

I have argued that abortion is morally neutral and hence acceptable according to the second formulation of the categorical imperative. Even if the fetus is assumed to be a person having the same moral status as that as the pregnant person, abortion is still worthy of neither praise nor blame. Of course, forced abortion is wrong because it implies the treatment of the pregnant person as a mere means, but elective abortion should be allowed for any reason because pregnant people deserve bodily autonomy just as much as everyone else.

Comments

[(Anonymous)]

but then my the onlooker, he have two option -- give to pregnant woman autonomy, or prevent fetus death. since this is conflicting moral thing as you say, he is no longer moral responsible for which he choose. so preventing woman from aborting is not morally wrong by your logic.

of course kant has big major flaw -- why should we treat someone as end in themself, and not as the means? there is no logical justification